

The Phonebusters

Matej Kovačič

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Kidz, don't try this at home!

For the described procedures certified equipment has been used.

We also performed an analysis of our own communications, We did not caused any interference in the Slovenian GSM networks.

No SIM card has been cloned. No mobile phone has been harmed or tortured.


The purpose of our study was to draw attention to the security vulnerabilities in the Slovenian GSM networks. Our aim is to improve GSM security and consequently to increase the level of privacy of mobile users. We would like that Slovenian mobile operators begin to invest more in network security and protection of its users.

Our study also showed the weaknesses in the retention of traffic data (so-called data retention) – we believe that reliability of traffic data in criminal proceedings is questionable.

Data on a SIM card

Data on a SIM card

1: SIM card reader



Data on a SIM card

2: changing contents of data on a SIM card, including SMS content and metadata

SMS edit

Message Text (44 / 160)

Septembra 2001 bo teroristicni napad na W TC.

Date: Fri Jan 12 1
From: 640 [REDACTED]
Status: Deleted

Save Prekliči

(2/35) sms messages

Status	Date	From	Message
Read	Wed Oct 15 16:04:57 2014	123456	Sporocilo iz prihodnosti...
Read	Fri Jan 12 18:54:37 2001	+38640 [REDACTED]	Septembra 2001 bo teroristicni napad na WTC.

SMS_export.txt (~/.Namizje/SIMreader) - gedit

```
# Date, From, ServiceCenter, Message
Wed Oct 15 16:04:57 2014,123456,+38641001333,Sporocilo iz prihodnosti...
Fri Jan 12 18:54:37 2001,+38640 [REDACTED],+38641001333,Septembra 2001 bo teroristicni napad na WTC.
```

Običajno besedilo | Širina tabulatorja: 8 | Vr. 2, St. 70 | VST

SIM Information

Location: 293F40
MSISDN: 000000486
Serial number: 89386400707
IMSI number: 2934001135
SIM phase: Phase 2+

	Activated	Tries left
PIN1	Yes	3
PIN2	Yes	3

Data on a SIM card

3: result



BUSTED!



Spoofing the identity of SMS sender

Sending of SMS “from” arbitrary number

```
<http://provider.com/sms/json?  
username=xxxxxxx&password=xxxxxxx&from=Phreaker  
&to=38631123456&text=Sending%20of%20SMS  
%20from%20number%20which%20is%20not%20a  
%20number.>
```



Sending of SMS "from" arbitrary number




BUSTED!

Spoofting the identity of a caller

(some operators implemented security patches, but in certain circumstances, procedure still works)

Calling with arbitrary caller ID

1: setting-up the infrastructure



Calling with arbitrary caller ID

2: look into the virtual PBX

The image shows two overlapping browser windows from the Trixbox Admin Mode. The background window displays the 'PBX Status' page, and the foreground window displays the configuration page for extension 1000.

Background Window: PBX Status

Version: Asterisk 1.6.0.26-FONCORE-r78 built by root @ revision

Uptime: System uptime: 7 hours, 5 minutes, 43 seconds; Last reload: 1 hour, 10 minutes, 54 seconds

Active Channel(s): 0 active SIP dialogs

Peer	User/ANR	Call ID
0 SIP registrations.		

Sip Registry

Host	Username	Refresh
0 SIP registrations.		

Sip Peers

Name/username	Host	Dyn	Nat	Auth
2000	(Unspecified)	D	N	A
1000/1000	192.168.56.1	D	N	A

2 sip peers [Monitored: 1 online, 1 offline Unmonitored]

IAX2 Registry

Host	dnsmgr	Username	Perceived
0 IAX2 registrations.			

IAX2 Peers

Name/Username	Host	Mask
[REDACTED]	(S)	255.255.255.255

1 iax2 peers [1 online, 0 offline, 0 unmonitored]

Foreground Window: Extension: 1000

Display Name: Matej 1

CID Num Alias: [REDACTED]

SIP Alias: [REDACTED]

Outbound CID: "386 [REDACTED]" <386 [REDACTED]>

Ring Time: Default

Call Waiting: Enable

Call Screening: Disable

A red arrow points to the Outbound CID field.

Calling with arbitrary caller ID

3: result on a phone



Calling with arbitrary caller ID

4: traffic data recorded by the mobile provider

	25.02.2012	11:11:02	1 E	0	SVNSM-Si.mobil	SMS_poslan / 38631595xxx	Out
	25.02.2012	11:57:43	0:01:00	0	SVNSM-Si.mobil		In
	25.02.2012	13:07:13	0:00:41	0	SVNSM-Si.mobil		In
	25.02.2012	15:39:09	0:02:05	0	SVNSM-Si.mobil		In
	25.02.2012	16:37:28	0:00:50	0	SVNSM-Si.mobil		In
	25.02.2012	23:41:22	0:00:04	0	SVNSM-Si.mobil	38640222xxx	In

25.02.2012	23:41:22	0:00:04	0	SVNSM-Si.mobil	38640222xxx	In
25.02.2012	23:43:21	0:00:02	0	SVNSM-Si.mobil	38640444xxx	In
25.02.2012	23:45:04	0:00:02	0	SVNSM-Si.mobil	38640666xxx	In
25.02.2012	23:46:37	0:00:02	0	SVNSM-Si.mobil	38640888xxx	In

	27.02.2012	9:51:56	1 E	0	SVNSM-Si.mobil		Out
	27.02.2012	9:53:05	1 E	0	SVNSM-Si.mobil		In
	27.02.2012	12:02:08	0:02:44	0	SVNSM-Si.mobil		Out
	27.02.2012	12:06:54	0:00:20	0	SVNSM-Si.mobil		Out
	27.02.2012	12:36:34	0:00:42	0	SVNSM-Si.mobil		Out
	27.02.2012	12:46:55	1 E	0	SVNSM-Si.mobil		Out
	27.02.2012	12:49:48	1 E	0	SVNSM-Si.mobil		In

Practical use :-)

GSM module for unlocking the door

GSM module to open garage or front door

We offer a useful device with a simple phone call opens or closes the automated garage or front door.


GSM module is a device which allows an authorized user to open or close the door. Device recognizes up to five specific phone numbers from which they can call on a GSM module which opens or closes the door.

Iku d.o.o. offers you:

- delivery of a package with instructions for use,
- mounting points agreed upon (please call us and we will send you the offer).

Using the GSM module to open the door:

on automated garage, front door or other GSM module is installed, in which the records are up to five phone (mobile) numbers, which is possible with a quick phone call. in order to door opened or close the door. This method accounts for the use of remote controls or mobile phone is already



BUSTED!

GSM traffic security

GSM security – the beginning of the story



John Nevil Maskelyne
(1839 – 1917)



Kiberpipa
(2012)

Redirected from page "[ASCrackingProject](#)"

[Clear message](#)

Immutable Page [Info](#) [Attachments](#)

[FindPage](#) [RecentChanges](#)

[cracking a5](#)

The A5 Cracking Project

NEWS: Someone vandalised the Wiki. I've thus removed write permissions for everyone. From now on if you want to add information you have to send them to me (steve at segfault.net) instead of editing this page directly.

NEWS: We have created a PRIVATE A5 mailinglist. If you feel you have something to contribute to the project, please contact me. The reason for this has been explained on the public mailinglist a5 [at] lists.segfault.net.

Powered by [EFF](#).

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
Nokia 3310

GSM cracking project



A5 Buster

Some GSM basics



SIM card and mobile equipment, IMSI, TMSI, A5/x, “broadcast channels” and data channels...

Scheme of the GSM network, source: www.gsmfordummies.com.


OsmocomBB

Mobile phone with Calypso chipset...



Hardware part can consist of other devices too, see RTL-SDR project!

...and OsmocomBB firmware



Loading romloader

```
matej@cryptopia: ~/osmocom/osmocom-bb-raw/src/host/osmocon
Die ID code: 7e540b2fc90393bb
=====
REG_DPLL=0x2413
CNTL_ARM_CLK=0xf0a1
CNTL_CLK=0xff91
CNTL_RST=0xfff3
CNTL_ARM_DIV=0xfff9
=====
Power up simcard:

THIS FIRMWARE WAS COMPILED WITHOUT TX SUPPORT!!!
Assert DSP into Reset
Releasing DSP from Reset
Installing DSP sniff patch
Setting some dsp_api.ndb values
Setting API NDB parameters
DSP Download Status: 0x0001
DSP API Version: 0x0000 0x0000
Finishing download phase
DSP Download Status: 0x0002
DSP API Version: 0x3606 0x0000
LOST 3901!
LOST 3750!
```

Base station scan...

```
Failed to connect to '/tmp/osmocomb_sap'.
Failed during sap_open(), no SIM reader
<000e> cell_log.c:803 Scanner initialized
Mobile initialized, please start phone now!
<000e> cell_log.c:367 Measure from 0 to 124
<000e> cell_log.c:367 Measure from 512 to 885
<000e> cell_log.c:367 Measure from 955 to 1023
<000e> cell_log.c:358 Measurement done
<000e> cell_log.c:340 Sync ARFCN 79 (rxlev -57, 197 syncs left)
<000e> cell_log.c:340 Sync ARFCN 19 (rxlev -64, 196 syncs left)
<000e> cell_log.c:340 Sync ARFCN 17 (rxlev -65, 195 syncs left)
<000e> cell_log.c:340 Sync ARFCN 113 (rxlev -65, 194 syncs left)
<000e> cell_log.c:340 Sync ARFCN 80 (rxlev -74, 193 syncs left)
<000e> cell_log.c:340 Sync ARFCN 18 (rxlev -81, 192 syncs left)
<000e> cell_log.c:190 Cell: ARFCN=18 MCC=293 MNC=40 (Slovenia, Si.mobil)
<000e> cell_log.c:340 Sync ARFCN 20 (rxlev -81, 191 syncs left)
<000e> cell_log.c:340 Sync ARFCN 107 (rxlev -81, 190 syncs left)
<000e> cell_log.c:340 Sync ARFCN 4 (rxlev -83, 189 syncs left)
<000e> cell_log.c:340 Sync ARFCN 114 (rxlev -84, 188 syncs left)
<000e> cell_log.c:340 Sync ARFCN 16 (rxlev -85, 187 syncs left)
<000e> cell_log.c:190 Cell: ARFCN=16 MCC=293 MNC=40 (Slovenia, Si.mobil)
<000e> cell_log.c:340 Sync ARFCN 81 (rxlev -85, 186 syncs left)
<000e> cell_log.c:340 Sync ARFCN 111 (rxlev -85, 185 syncs left)
<000e> cell_log.c:340 Sync ARFCN 112 (rxlev -86, 184 syncs left)
<000e> cell_log.c:190 Cell: ARFCN=112 MCC=293 MNC=41 (Slovenia, iPKO)
<000e> cell_log.c:340 Sync ARFCN 8 (rxlev -88, 183 syncs left)
<000e> cell_log.c:340 Sync ARFCN 85 (rxlev -89, 182 syncs left)
<000e> cell_log.c:340 Sync ARFCN 987 (rxlev -89, 181 syncs left)
<000e> cell_log.c:340 Sync ARFCN 14 (rxlev -90, 180 syncs left)
<000e> cell_log.c:340 Sync ARFCN 29 (rxlev -90, 179 syncs left)
<000e> cell_log.c:340 Sync ARFCN 110 (rxlev -92, 178 syncs left)
<000e> cell_log.c:340 Sync ARFCN 1014 (rxlev -93, 177 syncs left)
<000e> cell_log.c:340 Sync ARFCN 45 (rxlev -94, 176 syncs left)
<000e> cell_log.c:340 Sync ARFCN 66 (rxlev -94, 175 syncs left)
<000e> cell_log.c:340 Sync ARFCN 116 (rxlev -94, 174 syncs left)
<000e> cell_log.c:340 Sync ARFCN 77 (rxlev -95, 173 syncs left)
<000e> cell_log.c:340 Sync ARFCN 979 (rxlev -95, 172 syncs left)
<000e> cell_log.c:340 Sync ARFCN 118 (rxlev -96, 171 syncs left)
<000e> cell_log.c:340 Sync ARFCN 119 (rxlev -96, 170 syncs left)
<000e> cell_log.c:340 Sync ARFCN 983 (rxlev -96, 169 syncs left)
<000e> cell_log.c:340 Sync ARFCN 986 (rxlev -96, 168 syncs left)
```

ARFCN scan with *cell_log* application.

GSM traffic analysis...

The image shows a Wireshark 1.6.7 interface capturing traffic from interface 'lo'. The packet list pane displays several frames, with frame 2734 selected. The packet details pane shows the structure of a Location Updating Request (LAPDm) frame. The packet bytes pane shows the raw data of the selected frame. In the foreground, a terminal window displays the output of the `ccch_scan` application, showing burst indicators and error messages.

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
2729	16:31:09.285005	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	GSMTAP	81	(CCCH) (RR) System Information Type 5
2730	16:31:09.312958	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	GSMTAP	81	(CCCH) (RR) Immediate Assignment
2731	16:31:09.405488	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	GSMTAP	81	(CCCH) (RR) Paging Request Type 1
2732	16:31:09.493026	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	U, func=UI
2733	16:31:09.728229	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	U F, func=UA(DTAP) (MM) Location Updating Request
2734	16:31:09.875997	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	U, func=UI(DTAP) (RR) System Information Type 5
2735	16:31:09.963756	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	I, N(R)=1, N(S)=0(DTAP) (MM) Location Updating Reject
2736	16:31:10.199081	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm		
2737	16:31:10.434633	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm		
2738	16:31:10.670132	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm		

```
<000c> l1ctl.c:290 BURST IND: @(708084 = 0534/00/00) (-47 dBm, SNR 255
<000c> l1ctl.c:290 BURST IND: @(708085 = 0534/01/01) (-47 dBm, SNR 255
<000c> l1ctl.c:290 BURST IND: @(708086 = 0534/02/02) (-47 dBm, SNR 255
<000c> l1ctl.c:290 BURST IND: @(708087 = 0534/03/03) (-47 dBm, SNR 255
<0001> app_ccch_scan.c:709 Burst data
<000c> l1ctl.c:290 BURST IND: @(708099 = 0534/15/15) (-110 dBm, SNR 5
<000c> l1ctl.c:290 BURST IND: @(708100 = 0534/16/16) (-110 dBm, SNR 3
<000c> l1ctl.c:290 BURST IND: @(708101 = 0534/17/17) (-110 dBm, SNR 11
<000c> l1ctl.c:290 BURST IND: @(708102 = 0534/18/18) (-110 dBm, SNR 1
<0001> app_ccch_scan.c:721 Error decoding data, data encrypted?
<000c> l1ctl.c:290 BURST IND: @(708116 = 0534/06/32) (-47 dBm, SNR 1
<000c> l1ctl.c:290 BURST IND: @(708117 = 0534/07/33) (-47 dBm, SNR 2
<000c> l1ctl.c:290 BURST IND: @(708118 = 0534/08/34) (-47 dBm, SNR 2
<000c> l1ctl.c:290 BURST IND: @(708119 = 0534/09/35) (-47 dBm, SNR 1
<0001> app_ccch_scan.c:721 Error decoding data, data encrypted?
<000c> l1ctl.c:290 BURST IND: @(708131 = 0534/21/47) (-110 dBm, SNR 3
<000c> l1ctl.c:290 BURST IND: @(708132 = 0534/22/48) (-110 dBm, SNR 0
<000c> l1ctl.c:290 BURST IND: @(708133 = 0534/23/49) (-110 dBm, SNR 2
<000c> l1ctl.c:290 BURST IND: @(708134 = 0534/24/50) (-110 dBm, SNR 0
<0001> app_ccch_scan.c:721 Error decoding data, data encrypted?
<000c> l1ctl.c:290 BURST IND: @(708135 = 0534/25/00) (-47 dBm, SNR 255
```

GSM traffic analysis. Traffic is captured with `ccch_scan` application and shown in Wireshark.

Security analysis of slovenian GSM networks

Authors: Jaka Hudoklin, Matej Kovačič, Primož Bratanič

[some vulnerabilities described are already fixed]

Use of encryption - Mobitel

mobitel_dokaz.pcap [Wireshark 1.6.7]

Filter: lapdm Expression... Clear Apply

Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	U, func=UI
127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	U, func=UI(DTAP) (RR) System Information Type 5
127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	U F, func=UA(DTAP) (RR) Paging Response
127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	I, N(R)=1, N(S)=0(DTAP) (RR) CIPHERING Mode Command
127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	U, func=UI(DTAP) (RR) System Information Type 5
127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	U F, func=UA(DTAP) (MM) CM Service Request
127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	I, N(R)=1, N(S)=0(DTAP) (RR) CIPHERING Mode Command
127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	U, func=UI
127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	U, func=UI(DTAP) (RR) System Information Type 5
127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	U F, func=UA(DTAP) (RR) Paging Response
127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	I, N(R)=1, N(S)=0(DTAP) (RR) CIPHERING Mode Command

► Protocol Discriminator: Radio Resources Management messages
DTAP Radio Resources Management Message Type: CIPHERING Mode Command (0x35)
.... 1 = SC: Start ciphering (1)
.... 000. = Algorithm identifier: Cipher with algorithm A5/1 (0)
...0 = CR: IMEISV shall not be included (0)

0010 00 43 b7 81 40 00 40 11 85 26 7f 00 00 01 7f 00 ...
0020 00
0030 24
0040 2b
0050 2b

Algorithm identifier (gsm_a.algorithm_identifier), 1 ... Packets: 671 Displayed: 11 Marked: 0 Load time: 0:00.018 Profile: ...

Mobitel was using A5/1 encryption.

Use of encryption - Mobitel

lo (loopback) [Wireshark 1.7.2 (SVN Rev 42711 from /trunk)]

File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Tools Internals Help

Filter: **gsmtap** Expression... Clear Apply Save

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
3825	68.987088000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	GSMTAP	81	(CCCH) (RR) Paging Request Type 1
3826	69.013994000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	GSMTAP	81	(CCCH) (RR) Paging Request Type 1
3827	69.033247000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	GSMTAP	81	(CCCH) (RR) Immediate Assignment
3828	69.107356000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	U, func=UI(DTAP) (RR) System Information Type 5
3846	69.176329000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	U, func=UI
3847	69.195339000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	U, func=UI
3851	69.264335000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	U P, func=SABM(DTAP) (RR) Paging Response
3861	69.430295000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	U F, func=UA(DTAP) (RR) Paging Response
3878	69.499130000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	I, N(R)=0, N(S)=0(DTAP) (RR) Classmark Change
3882	69.578184000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	U, func=UI(DTAP) (RR) System Information Type 5
3890	69.647263000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	U, func=UI(DTAP) (RR) Measurement Report
3891	69.665252000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	T, N(R)=1, N(S)=0 (Fragment)

.... 1... = SM capability (in SMS pt-to-pt capability): mobile station supports mobile terminated point-to-point SMS
.... 0.. = VBS notification reception: no VBS capability or no notifications wanted
.... 0.. = VGCS notification reception: no VGCS capability or no notifications wanted
.... 1 = FC Frequency Capability: The MS does support the E-GSM or R-GSM
1... 1... = CM3: The MS supports options that are indicated in classmark 3 IE
0.. 1... = Spare: 0
..1. 1... = LCS VA capability (LCS value added location request notification capability): LCS value added location request notification capability supported
...1 1... = UCS2 treatment: the ME has no preference between the use of the default alphabet and the use of UCS2
.... 0... = SoLSA: The ME does not support SoLSA
.... 0.. = CMSP: CM Service Prompt: Network initiated MO CM connection request not supported
.... 1. = A5/3 algorithm supported: encryption algorithm A5/3 available
.... 0 = A5/2 algorithm supported: encryption algorithm A5/2 not available

0030 3c d4 00 1f f5 96 08 00 00 00 01 00 45 06 16 03 <.....E...
0040 53 19 b2 20 09 60 14 28 04 e0 01 0a 10 00 2b 2b S. .(.....++
0050 2b +

If mobile phone said it is supporting A5/3...

Use of encryption - Mobitel

The image shows a Wireshark 1.7.2 capture of GSM TAP traffic. The filter is set to 'gsmtap'. The packet list shows several LAPDm frames, including a 'Ciphering Mode Command' (frame 3934) and a 'Cipher Mode Response' (frame 3935). The packet details for frame 3934 are expanded, showing the 'GSM A-I/F DTAP - Ciphering Mode Command' structure. The 'Cipher Mode Setting' section is expanded, showing the 'Algorithm identifier: Cipher with algorithm A5/1 (0)'. The packet bytes are displayed at the bottom, showing the hex and ASCII representation of the response frame.

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
3890	69.047205000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	O, func=01(DTAP) (RR) Measurement Report
3891	69.665252000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	I, N(R)=1, N(S)=0 (Fragment)
3895	69.735205000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	I, N(R)=1, N(S)=1(DTAP) (RR) GPRS Suspension Request
3896	69.901307000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	I, N(R)=2, N(S)=1(DTAP) (MM) Authentication Request
3905	69.970288000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	S, func=RR, N(R)=2
3907	70.048271000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	I, N(R)=0, N(S)=0
3910	70.118248000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	U, func=UI(DTAP) (RR) Measurement Report
3911	70.136272000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	U, func=UI
3914	70.205219000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	I, N(R)=2, N(S)=2(DTAP) (MM) Authentication Response
3934	70.371245000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	I, N(R)=3, N(S)=2(DTAP) (RR) Ciphering Mode Command
4076	74.114093000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	GSMTAP	81	(CCCH) (RR) Paging Request Type 1
4077	74.147044000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	GSMTAP	81	(CCCH) (RR) System Information Type 1

Frame 3934: 81 bytes on wire (648 bits), 81 bytes captured (648 bits) on interface 0
Ethernet II, Src: 00:00:00_00:00:00 (00:00:00:00:00:00), Dst: 00:00:00_00:00:00 (00:00:00:00:00:00)
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 127.0.0.1 (127.0.0.1), Dst: 127.0.0.1 (127.0.0.1)
User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 45090 (45090), Dst Port: gsmtap (4729)
GSM TAP Header, ARFCN: 101 (Downlink), TS: 1, Channel: SDCCH/8 (0)
Link Access Procedure, Channel Dm (LAPDm)
GSM A-I/F DTAP - Ciphering Mode Command
Protocol Discriminator: Radio Resources Management messages
DTAP Radio Resources Management Message Type: Ciphering Mode Command (0x35)
Cipher Mode Setting
.... ...1 = SC: Start ciphering (1)
... 000. = Algorithm identifier: Cipher with algorithm A5/1 (0)
Cipher Mode Response
0030 2f ff 00 1f f6 53 08 00 00 00 03 64 0d 06 35 01 /....S.. ...d..5
0040 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b ++++++ ++++++
0050 2b +

...network replied that only A5/1 is available.

Use of encryption - Simobil

The image shows a Wireshark 1.6.7 capture of a network trace. The main display area shows a list of captured packets. The selected packet is a LAPDm packet (length 81) sent to 127.0.0.1, identified as a CIPHERING MODE COMMAND. The packet details pane shows the following structure:

- Protocol Discriminator: Radio Resources Management messages
- DTAP Radio Resources Management Message Type: CIPHERING MODE COMMAND (0x35)
- ...1 ...1 = SC: Start ciphering (1)
- ... 010. = Algorithm identifier: Cipher with algorithm A5/3 (2)
- ...1 ...1 = CR: IMEISV shall be included (1)

The packet bytes pane shows the raw data, with the first few bytes highlighted in orange, corresponding to the algorithm identifier field.

Algorithm identifier (gsm_a.algorithm_identifier), 1 ... Packets: 2784 Displayed: 2784 Marked: 0 Load time: 0:00.039 Profile: ...

Simobil was using A5/3 also, however...

Use of encryption - Simobil

Capturing from lo (loopback) [Wireshark 1.7.2 (SVN Rev 42553 from /trunk)]

File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Tools Internals Help

Filter: **gsmtap** Expression... Clear Apply Shrani

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
3773	22:26:20.514226000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	GSMTAP	81	(CCCH) (RR) Immediate Assignment
3774	22:26:20.541699000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	GSMTAP	81	(CCCH) (RR) Paging Request Type 1
3775	22:26:20.578433000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	U, func=UI
3778	22:26:20.647704000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	U P, func=SABM(DTAP) (MM) CM Service Request
3779	22:26:20.813785000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	U F, func=UA(DTAP) (MM) CM Service Request
3782	22:26:20.884139000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	U, func=UI
3783	22:26:20.887652000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	U, func=UI(DTAP) (RR) System Information Type 5
3786	22:26:20.956903000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	U, func=UI(DTAP) (RR) Measurement Report
3787	22:26:21.049291000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	I, N(R)=0, N(S)=0(DTAP) (RR) Ciphering Mode Command
3790	22:26:21.118537000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	S, func=RR, N(R)=1
3791	22:26:21.284824000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	U, func=UI

▶ Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 127.0.0.1 (127.0.0.1), Dst: 127.0.0.1 (127.0.0.1)

▶ User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 58444 (58444), Dst Port: gsmtap (4729)

▶ GSM TAP Header, ARFCN: 32 (Downlink), TS: 0, Channel: SDCCH/8 (5)

▶ Link Access Procedure, Channel Dm (LAPDm)

▼ GSM A-I/F DTAP - Ciphering Mode Command

▶ Protocol Discriminator: Radio Resources Management messages
DTAP Radio Resources Management Message Type: Ciphering Mode Command (0x35)

▼ Cipher Mode Setting

.... ..0 = SC: No ciphering (0)

▼ Cipher Mode Response

...1 = CR: IMEISV shall be included (1)

```
0010 00 43 4f b1 40 00 40 11 ec f6 7f 00 00 01 7f 00 .CO.@.@. ....
0020 00 01 e4 4c 12 79 00 2f fe 42 02 04 01 00 00 20 ...L.y/.B....
0030 31 ff 00 19 7f 4b 08 00 05 00 03 00 0d 06 35 10 1....K.. .....5
0040 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b ++++++++ ++++++++
0050 2b +
```

...it was possible to switch the encryption completely off (use of A5/0).

Use of encryption - Tušmobil

Filter: Expression... Clear Apply

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
3924	11:33:28.259050	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	U, func=UI
3925	11:33:28.494726	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	U F, func=UA(DTAP) (MM) CM Service Request
3926	11:33:28.642709	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	U, func=UI(DTAP) (RR) System Information Type 6
3927	11:33:28.729845	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	I, N(R)=1, N(S)=0(DTAP) (RR) Ciphering Mode Command
3928	11:33:32.597576	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	GSMTAP	81	(CCCH) (RR) Paging Request Type 1
3929	11:33:32.625600	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	GSMTAP	81	(CCCH) (RR) Paging Request Type 1
3930	11:33:32.643732	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	GSMTAP	81	(CCCH) (RR) Paging Request Type 1
3931	11:33:32.671623	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	GSMTAP	81	(CCCH) (RR) Paging Request Type 1
3932	11:33:32.689638	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	GSMTAP	81	(CCCH) (RR) Paging Request Type 1
3933	11:33:32.722675	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	GSMTAP	81	(CCCH) (RR) System Information Type 3
3934	11:33:32.740630	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	GSMTAP	81	(CCCH) (SS)
3935	11:33:32.768554	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	GSMTAP	81	(CCCH) (RR) Paging Request Type 1
3936	11:33:32.786624	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	GSMTAP	81	(CCCH) (RR) Paging Request Type 1

Signal/Noise Ratio (dB): 44
Signal Level (dBm): 255
GSM Frame Number: 1109410
Channel Type: SDCCH/8 (8)
Antenna Number: 0
Sub-Slot: 1

- ▶ Link Access Procedure, Channel Dm (LAPDm)
- ▼ GSM A-I/F DTAP - Ciphering Mode Command
 - ▶ Protocol Discriminator: Radio Resources Management messages
 - DTAP Radio Resources Management Message Type: Ciphering Mode Command (0x35)
 - 1 = SC: Start ciphering (1)
 - ... 000. = Algorithm identifier: Cipher with algorithm A5/1 (0)
 - ... 0 = CR: IMEISV shall not be included (0)

0030
0040
0050

Algorithm identifier (gsm_a.algori... = Packets: 7219 Displayed: 7219 Marked: 0 Profile: Default

Tušmobil was using encryption algorithm A5/1.

Cryptanalysis of session key K_c **(without possession of mobile phone and/or SIM card)**


[on this specific attack are vulnerable only networks with A5/1 and without random padding]

[slightly modified attack can be successfully used against networks with random padding]


Creating of session key Kc

Encryption key **Ki** is stored on a SIM card **and in** HLR registry. Session key **Kc** derives from **Ki**, and is used to encryption of SMS and voice conversation.

1.




2.



Creating of session key Kc

- 3.** On both sides Kc is created (with use of A8 algorithm):

$$K_i + \text{RAND} @ \text{A8} = \mathbf{K_c}$$



If SRES is the same on both sides, network and mobile phone have both the same Kc. That means session key is "exchanged" without being transferred through the network. Encryption is now being done with Kc + A5/x. "Over the air" are transferred only encrypted data.

Cryptanalysis of A5/1 *a theory*

CONTENT OF DATA BURST IN GSM



72	FE	BC	10	74	70	C4	2B	2B	2B	2B	2B	2B
----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----

"ONE-TIME" KEY FOR ENCRYPTION OF DATA STREAM

D1	E8	02	BF	B7	A0	86	BB	37	E3	E3	E8	02
----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----

ENCRYPTED MESSAGE (XOR)

A3	16	BE	AF	C3	D0	42	90	1C	C8	C8	C3	29
----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----




Kraken




Kc

Locating of user in mobile network

We start sending silent SMS'es to a mobile number. During this we observe which TMSI number is receiving (encrypted) data.



Capture and cryptanalysis of A5/1 *a practice*



- From the “air” we passively capture encrypted data packets.
- With the help of guessing the contents of the GSM burst (guessing the padding bits) we calculate “one-time” encryption key.
- We use cryptanalysis to reconstruct session key K_c .
- In the process we need no access to the SIM card, mobile phone or mobile network!

Non-random padding

File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Tools Internals Help

Filter: **gsmtap** Expression... Clear Apply Save GSM RR & MM GSMTAP grprs_attach

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
7655	108.227450000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	S F, func=REJ, N(R)=3
7656	108.375464000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	U, func=UI(DTAP) (RR) System Information Type 6
7657	108.463596000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	U F, func=UA
7658	108.463625000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	I, N(R)=0, N(S)=0 (Fragment)
7659	108.698485000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	U F, func=UA
7660	108.805036000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	U, func=UI(DTAP) (RR) Measurement Report
7661	108.847589000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	U, func=UI(DTAP) (RR) System Information Type 5
7662	108.933511000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	U, func=UI
7699	109.169575000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	S, func=RR, N(R)=1
7700	109.169603000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	GSM SMS	81	I, N(R)=0, N(S)=1(DTAP) (SMS) CP-DATA (RP) RP-DATA
7715	109.318670000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	U, func=UI(DTAP) (RR) System Information Type 5
7727	109.404635000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	I, N(R)=2, N(S)=0(DTAP) (SMS) CP-ACK

```

..00 0000 0101 0000 = ARFCN: 80
.0.. .... .... .... = Uplink: 0
Signal/Noise Ratio (dB): 186
Signal Level (dBm): 0
GSM Frame Number: 1527093
Channel Type: SDCCCH/8 (8)
Antenna Number: 0
Sub-Slot: 0
Link Access Procedure, Channel Dm (LAPDm)
  Address Field: 0x0d
  Control field: U F, func=UA (0x73)
  Length Field: 0x01
0020 00 01 00 00 12 79 00 21 1e 42 02 04 01 01 00 50 .....y./ .B.....P
0030 ba 00 00 17 4d 35 08 00 00 00 0d 73 01 2b 2b 2b ....M5.. ..S.+++
0040 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b 2b ++++++++ ++++++++
0050 2b
+

```

Link Access Procedure, Chann... Packets: 60598 Displayed: 13503 Marked: 0 Profile: Default

Random padding

File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Tools Internals Help

Filter: **gsmtap** Expression... Clear Apply Save GSM RR & MM GSMTAP grprs_attach

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
7627	107.286236000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	U, func=UI
7628	107.434340000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	U, func=UI(DTAP) (RR) System Information Type 5
7629	107.521364000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	I, N(R)=2, N(S)=2(DTAP) (MM) Identity Request
7630	107.521394000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	S, func=RR, N(R)=3
7631	107.521416000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	I, N(R)=3, N(S)=2(DTAP) (MM) Identity Response
7647	107.757356000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	I P, N(R)=2, N(S)=2(DTAP) (MM) Identity Request
7648	107.757384000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	S F, func=REJ, N(R)=3
7650	107.804857000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	U, func=UI(DTAP) (RR) Measurement Report
7651	107.905608000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	U, func=UI(DTAP) (RR) System Information Type 5
7652	107.992348000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	I P, N(R)=2, N(S)=2(DTAP) (MM) Identity Request
7653	108.050717000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	U P, func=SABM
7654	108.227422000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	LAPDm	81	I P, N(R)=3, N(S)=2(DTAP) (MM) Identity Request

[Coloring Rule String: udp]

- ▶ Ethernet II, Src: 00:00:00 00:00:00 (00:00:00:00:00:00), Dst: 00:00:00 00:00:00 (00:00:00:00:00:00)
- ▶ Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 127.0.0.1 (127.0.0.1), Dst: 127.0.0.1 (127.0.0.1)
- ▶ User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 48605 (48605), Dst Port: gsmtap (4729)
- ▶ GSM TAP Header, ARFCN: 104 (Downlink), TS: 1, Channel: SDCCH/8 (0)
- ▶ Link Access Procedure, Channel Dm (LAPDm)
- ▼ GSM A-I/F DTAP - Identity Request
 - ▶ Protocol Discriminator: Mobility Management messages
 - 00.. = Sequence number: 0
 - ..01 1000 = DTAP Mobility Management Message Type: Identity Request (0x18)
 - 0000 = Spare bit(s): 0
 - ▶ Identity Type
 - 0020 00 01 00 0d 12 79 00 21 1e 42 02 04 01 01 00 08y./ .B.....ll
 - 0030 bd 00 00 17 4c 9c 08 00 00 00 03 54 0d 05 18 03L... ..T...
 - 0040 92 da c9 32 8d 59 71 d1 8e ce 4e 6e 35 dd 65 25 ...2.Yq. ..Nn5.e%
 - 0050 3d 1

GSM A-I/F DTAP (gsm_a_dtap),... Packets: 36968 Displayed: 8864 Marked: 0 Profile: Default

Cracking A5/1 session key Kc in a practice

The image shows a Wireshark 1.7.2 interface capturing traffic on a loopback interface (lo). The filter is set to 'gsmmap'. The packet list shows a series of LAPDm packets (Nos. 160-171) and one GSM SMS packet (No. 168). The details pane for packet 168 is expanded, showing the TP-User-Data field with the following text:

```
SMS text: Najdi.si SMS (od 040...): test\n(Mobitelova mobilna stran http://m.mobitel.si)
```

The status bar at the bottom indicates: 'The text of the SMS (gsm_sms...): Packets: 2892 Displayed: 256 Marked: 0 Profile: Default'

... and decrypted SMS message (received through 2G network).

Application gsmcrack.py automatically identifies the TMSI number from the phone number (by sending silent SMS's). When we have TMSI of the “target”, our application is able to automatically follow the phone to an assigned dedicated channel and record encrypted message.

BUSTED!

Mobile identity

Mobile identity spoofing in GSM network **(without possession of mobile phone and/or SIM card)**

[vulnerability were fixed in most of slovenian GSM networks, procedure described is not working anymore]

Application *mobile*

```
matej@cryptopia: ~/osmocom/osmocom-bb/src/host/layer23/src/mobile
<000f> sim.c:241 SELECT (file=0x7f20)
<000f> sim.c:187 sending APDU (class 0xa0, ins 0xa4)
<000f> sim.c:876 received APDU (len=0 sw1=0x9f sw2=0x1a)
<000f> sim.c:949 command successfull
<000f> sim.c:571 GET RESPONSE (len=26)
<000f> sim.c:187 sending APDU (class 0xa0, ins 0xc0)
<000f> sim.c:876 received APDU (len=26 sw1=0x90 sw2=0x00)
<000f> sim.c:949 command successfull
<000f> sim.c:241 SELECT (file=0x6f07)
<000f> sim.c:187 sending APDU (class 0xa0, ins 0xa4)
<000f> sim.c:876 received APDU (len=0 sw1=0x9f sw2=0x0f)
<000f> sim.c:949 command successfull
<000f> sim.c:571 GET RESPONSE (len=15)
<000f> sim.c:187 sending APDU (class 0xa0, ins 0xc0)
<000f> sim.c:876 received APDU (len=15 sw1=0x90 sw2=0x00)
<000f> sim.c:949 command successfull
<000f> sim.c:1065 selected file (len 9)
<000f> sim.c:277 READ BINARY (offset=0 len=9)
<000f> sim.c:187 sending APDU (class 0xa0, ins 0xb0)
<000f> sim.c:876 received APDU (len=0 sw1=0x98 sw2=0x04)
<000f> sim.c:880 SIM Security
<000f> sim.c:151 sending result to callback function (type=1)
<0005> subscriber.c:655 PIN is required, 3 tries left
```

Application *mobile* is used for calling and sending and receiving SMS messages on a OsmocomBB mobile phones.

Application *mobile*

```
matej@cryptopia: ~  
OsmocomBB> enable  
OsmocomBB# sim pin 1 [REDACTED]  
OsmocomBB#  
% (MS 1)  
% Trying to registering with network...  
  
% (MS 1)  
% On Network, normal service: Slovenia, Si.mobil  
  
OsmocomBB#  
OsmocomBB# sms  
    sms  Send an SMS  
OsmocomBB# sms  
    MS_NAME  Name of MS (see "show ms")  
OsmocomBB# sms 1  
    NUMBER  Phone number to send SMS (Use digits '0123456789*#abc', and '+' to  
            dial international)  
OsmocomBB# sms 1 041[REDACTED]  
    LINE  SMS text  
OsmocomBB# sms 1 041[REDACTED] test  
OsmocomBB#  
% (MS 1)  
% SMS to 041[REDACTED] successfull
```

Sending of SMS message from application *mobile*.

Application *mobile*

```
Terminal
bb.osmocom.org/trac/wiki/SIMReader
cd src/host/osmocon/
./osmocon -p /dev/ttyUSB0 -m c123xor ../../target/firmware/board

Now start mobile application:

cd src/host/layer23/src/mobile
./mobile -i 127.0.0.1

this will also start gsmmap which you can use to inspect traffic using Wireshark

matej@cryptopia: ~
matej@cryptopia: ~
matej@cryptopia: ~$ telnet localhost 4247
Trying 127.0.0.1...
Connected to localhost.
Escape character is '^]'.
Welcome to the OsmocomBB control interface
OsmocomBB> Connection closed by foreign host.
matej@cryptopia:~$ telnet localhost 4247
Trying 127.0.0.1...
Connected to localhost.
Escape character is '^]'.
Welcome to the OsmocomBB control interface
OsmocomBB> enab
OsmocomBB> enable
OsmocomBB# sim pin 1


matej@cryptopia: ~/osmocom/osmocom-bb/src/host/osmocon
L1CTL_RESET_REQ: FULL!SIM Request (7):
SIM Response (2):
SIM Request (5):
SIM Response (28)
SIM Request (7):
SIM Response (2):
SIM Request (5):
SIM Response (17)
SIM Request (5):

matej@cryptopia: ~/osmocom/osmocom-bb/src/host/layer23/src/mobile
ELECT (file=0x7f20)
ending APDU (class 0xa0, ins 0xa4)
received APDU (len=0 sw1=0x9f sw2=0x1a)
command successfull
ET RESPONSE (len=26)
ending APDU (class 0xa0, ins 0xc0)
received APDU (len=26 sw1=0x90 sw2=0x00)
command successfull
ELECT (file=0x6f07)
ending APDU (class 0xa0, ins 0xa4)
received APDU (len=0 sw1=0x9f sw2=0x0f)
command successfull
ET RESPONSE (len=15)
ending APDU (class 0xa0, ins 0xc0)
received APDU (len=15 sw1=0x90 sw2=0x00)
command successfull
selected file (len 9)
EAD BINARY (offset=0 len=9)
ending APDU (class 0xa0, ins 0xb0)
received APDU (len=0 sw1=0x98 sw2=0x04)
SIM Security
ending result to callback function (type=1)
<0005> subscriber.c:655 PIN is required, 3 tries left
```

Use of application *mobile*. In the background Osmocom ROM loader, application *mobile* and (in front) console of application *mobile*.

Mobile identity in mobile network

Users in the mobile network does not identify themselves by the phone number, but with the IMSI and TMSI number. Important parameters are also the encryption key K_c and the Key sequence number.



Mobile identity spoofing

If Kc does not change by every transaction, mobile identity can be easily spoofed. First, we have to identify IMSI number of our target...

1.



HLR lookup

HLR lookup is done through web service – we get IMSI number.

ROUTO Messaging

sales@rouptomessaging.com | +44 (0) 870 231 7777

Top Up now | user name: [redacted] | Logout

Home Administration Send SMS Send MMS HLR Tools SMS Inbox Connectivity My Accounts Help

HLR Tools

HLR Lookup

Bulk HLR Lookup

Bulk HLR Jobs

HLR Report

Bulk HLR Help

HLR HTTP Interface

HLR Lookup

Enter the mobile number in international format but without 00 or + at the beginning of the number. For example 0044786612345 would be entered as 44786612345.


Enter number: 3864 [redacted] Lookup

Request ID: [redacted]
Status: OK
Message: undefined
Number: 3864 [redacted]
IMSI: 29370 [redacted]
MCC: 293
MNC: 70
Home Operator Name: Tusmobile
Home Operator Country: Slovenia
MSC: 385980111
MSC Operator: T-mobile
MSC Country: Croatia
MSC Location: null
MSC MCC: 219
MSC MNC: 01

Descriptions: -- Select Parameter --

Detection of TMSI number

TMSI number is discovered by sending silent SMS messages. Meanwhile we intercept some GSM bursts (for cryptanalysis) and key sequence number.



Reconstruction of Kc


Session encryption key Kc is recovered through cryptanalysis. Now we have all information needed...

3.


A3	16	BE	AF	C3	D0	42	90	1C	C8	C8	C3	29
----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----

CONTENT OF DATA BURST IN GSM

72	FE	BC	10	74	70	C4	2B	2B	2B	2B	2B	2B
----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----



Kraken



Kc


“SIM spoof”

```
matej@cryptopia: ~
matej@cryptopia: ~
testcard      Attach built in test SIM
spooF         Attach spoofing SIM
reader        Attach SIM from reader
remove        Detach SIM card
pin           Enter PIN for SIM card
disable-pin   Disable PIN of SIM card
enable-pin    Enable PIN of SIM card
change-pin    Change PIN of SIM card
unlock-pin    Change PIN of SIM card
lai           Change LAI of SIM card
OsmocomBB# sim spo
OsmocomBB# sim spooF
  MS_NAME      Name of MS (see "show ms")
OsmocomBB# sim spooF 1
  IMSI         IMSI you want to spoof
OsmocomBB# sim spooF 1 293[redacted]
  TMSI         TMSI you want to spoof
OsmocomBB# sim spooF 1 293[redacted] 0x6[redacted]
  KC           Encrption key of spoofed mobile
OsmocomBB# sim spooF 1 293[redacted] 0x6[redacted] 85[redacted]
  KEY_SEQUENCE Key sequence
OsmocomBB# sim spooF 1 293[redacted] 0x6[redacted] 85[redacted] 1
```

Mobile identity spoofing with “sim spooF” command. For spoofing we need IMSI number (SS7 lookup), TMSI number (from the network), session key (we check it) and key sequence number (from the network).

In networks with A5/0 we need only TMSI and key sequence number – no cryptanalysis needed!

Mobile identity spoofing



Two SMS messages sent by spoofed mobile identity.
Similarly it is possible to spoof voice calls too.

[video]

BUSTED!

“We strongly emphasize that the abuse of identity in the network of Telekom Slovenia is not possible.”

...

*Abuse of the mobile identity in the Mobitel's network is prevented by the high standard mechanisms. **No network in the world has better protection than we have in our GSM network.** Therefore, once again we remind that claims of abuse of user identity in the Telekom network are not real, however misuse of an identity outside of our network is not in our hands.”*

Reply from Telekom Slovenije for DELO newspaper, July, 30th 2012,
<<http://www.delo.si/druzba/infoteh/mobitelovo-omrezje-kljub-zagotovilom-telekoma-se-slabo-zasciteno.html>>

Traffic data in data retention database

**What does it means for the data retention measures
and eavesdropping?**

“Courts tend to regard
computer-generated materials as inherently
trustworthy evidence.”

“This has consequences for court procedure. In a
court witnesses are sworn in and cross-
examined to expose biases and conflicts. But what
about software as a witness?”

Sergey Bratus, Ashlyn Lembree in Anna Shubina. 2010.
Software on the Witness Stand: What Should It Take for Us to Trust It?

“Miran Kimovec from Mobitel company, who was the next witness, was also unable to explain how it was possible to record the eavesdropped conversation while Reich's mobile phone has not been registered to any of the Slovenian mobile operators. "Theoretically it would be possible that an Austrian citizen in Kranj caught a signal from Austrian operator, but practically it is almost impossible," he said. The trial will continue.”

Gorenjski glas, 2. marec 2007,
<[http://www.gorenjskiglas.si/novice/kronika/index.php?
action=clanek&id=4329](http://www.gorenjskiglas.si/novice/kronika/index.php?action=clanek&id=4329)>

BUSTED!

Mobile network security

Some other attacks on mobile networks


- **Disconnect mobile network from the network:** attacker who knows IMSI and TMSI number of the target, can disconnect target's mobile phone with [REDACTED] commands.
- **Shut down of a part of a mobile network:** if attackers sends more than [REDACTED] than base station has [REDACTED] in less than [REDACTED] seconds – mobile network shuts down. It is [REDACTED] attack which consequence is denial of the service.

BUSTED!

Mobile network authentication


Problem: mobile network does not authenticate to mobile phone

- The design of GSM network requires authentication of a mobile phone to to mobile network. But on the other side, mobile network **does not** authenticate to mobile phone
- Translation: mobile phone does not know to which network is really connected.
- Consequence: it is possible to perform attack with “IMSI-catcher”, special device, which pretends to be a legitimate base station. Since mobile phone does not know that this base station is fake, it connects to it.



Problem: mobile network does not authenticate to mobile phone

- When a mobile phone is connected to a fake base station, it »orders« him to stop encryption.
- GSM standard recommends ("*should*") informing the user when communication is not encrypted (3GPP Rel.9 TS 33.102-920 "3G Security Architecture" 5.5.1 Visibility, ciphering indicator feature - 3GPP TS 22.101")



Problem: mobile network does not authenticate to mobile phone

- But this notice is not shown if there is a special setting on a SIM card.

The ciphering indicator feature may be disabled by the home network operator setting data in the SIM/USIM. If this feature is not disabled by the SIM, then whenever a connection is in place, which is, or becomes unenciphered, an indication shall be given to the user. Ciphering itself is unaffected by this feature, and the user can choose how to proceed;"

*3GPP TS 22.101 specification (R99 22.101-3.17.0), section 13,
"Types of features of Ues"*

Problem: mobile network does not authenticate to mobile phone



Ciphering indicator is not very clear on some mobile phones, and even not shown at all on some others.

IMSI Catcher could be bought...


 REPUBLIKA SLOVENIJA
MINISTRSTVO ZA NOTRANJE ZADEVE
 Štefanova ulica 2, 1501 LJUBLJANA
 Telefon: 01 428 40 00; telefaks: 01 428 47 33
 E-pošta: gp.mnz@gov.si; http://www.mnz.gov.si

Številka: 029-34/2010/14 (2223-01)
 Datum: 17-06-2010

**MEDRESORSKA KOMISIJA
 ZA IZDAJO SOGLASIJ ZA IZVEDBO
 OBRAMBNIH IN ZAUPNIH NAROČIL**

Ministrstvo za obrambo
 Vojkova cesta 59
 1000 Ljubljana

sekretar komisije

ZADEVA: Vloga za soglasje k izvedbi naročila na podlagi Uredbe o obrambnih in zaupnih naročilih*1

V skladu s 5. členom Uredbe o obrambnih in zaupnih naročilih (Uradni list RS, št. 80/07), ki določa, da mora naročnik za izvedbo naročila po navedeni uredbi predhodno pridobiti soglasje medresorske komisije, imenovane s strani Vlade Republike Slovenije, vas prosimo za soglasje k izvedbi sledečega zaupnega naročila:

1. Naziv ter naslov naročnika, ki bo izvedel naročilo po Uredbi o obrambnih in zaupnih naročilih:

Ministrstvo za notranje zadeve, Policija, Štefanova 2, 1501 Ljubljana

2. Predmet naročila:

Nadgradnja sistema za ~~varnostno pregrado s~~ ~~zavarovanjem komunikacijskega predatnega~~

PREMI%C4%8CNINEdo2013.xls - LibreOffice Calc

Datoteka Uredi Pogled Vstavi Oblika Orodja Podatki Okno Pomoč

Arial 10

C181 fex Σ = Sistem za motenje in nadzor mobilne telefonije

	A	B	C	D	E	F
1	Preglednica 5: Načrt pridobivanja premičnega premoženja - leto 2013					
2						
3	Upravitelj	Zaporedna številka	Vrsta premičnega premoženja	Okvirni obseg premičnin	Predvidena sredstva (v EUR)	Ekonomska utemeljenost
	181	113	Sistem za motenje in nadzor mobilne telefonije	1	238.400,00	Nadzor in motenje mobilne telefonije - naprava je nepogrešljiv pripomoček pri opravljanju protipristuškovalnih pregledov.
	182	114	Sistem za motenje radijskih naprav	1	97.236,00	Onemogočanje komunikacije naprav, ki komunicirajo preko radiofrekvenčnega spektra - naprava je primerna za motenje v primeru sestankov zaupne narave in pri izvajanju policijskih pooblastil.
	183	115	Varnostna pregrada	1	64.000,00	Zaščita komunikacije z Internetom - potrebna je varnostna pregrada s

Delovni list 1 / 2 PageStyle_Preglednica 5 STA Vgota=0 100%

...or we can build our own

```
root@bt: ~/sylvainbts/osmocom-bb/src/host/osmocon.77x21
Charging at 239 LSB (204 mA).
BCICL2=0x3ff
battery-info.flags=0x00000000
bat_compal_e88_chg_state=0
BAT-ADC: 582 4 0 0 1023 393 367 235
Charger at 34 mV.
Battery at 3979 mV.
Charging at 0 mA.
Battery capacity is 97%.
Battery range is 3199..3999 mV.
Battery full at 468 LSB .. full at 585 LSB
Charging at 239 LSB (204 mA).
BCICL2=0x3ff
battery-info.flags=0x00000000
bat_compal_e88_chg_state=0
BAT-ADC: 581 4 0 0 1023 419 390 232
Charger at 34 mV.
Battery at 3972 mV.
Charging at 0 mA.
Battery capacity is 97%.

root@bt: ~/openBts/public/subscriberRegistry/trunk 77x20
root@bt:~/openBts/public/subscriberRegistry/trunk# ./sipauthserve
ALERT 3073615568 sipauthserve.cpp:214:main: ./sipauthserve (re)starting

root@bt:~/openBts/public/smqueue/trunk/smqueue 77x21
root@bt:~/openBts/public/smqueue/trunk/smqueue# ./smqueue
ALERT 3074709728 smqueue.cpp:2421:main: smqueue (re)starting
smqueue logs to syslogd facility LOCAL7, so there's not much to see here

root@bt:~/openBts/public/openbts/trunk/apps 77x20
<0011> trx.c:512 TRX Data 25706:0:0:816a80aa0221546952a45085401000
<0011> trx.c:512 TRX Data 25707:0:0:018a122916244ae0428548042a4480
<0011> trx.c:512 TRX Data 25708:0:0:14a01404481448700a10a010804aa0
<0011> trx.c:512 TRX Data 25709:0:0:4421420408540070a810001a212280
<0011> trx.c:190 TRX CLK Indication 25706
<0011> trx.c:512 TRX Data 25757:0:0:8062948a52a104e0402112806004a0
<0011> trx.c:512 TRX Data 25758:0:0:118a5288440000e102854a018a1600
<0011> trx.c:512 TRX Data 25759:0:0:408904254000607400058000200220
<0011> trx.c:512 TRX Data 25760:0:0:44a542052054286588022012a16200
<0011> trx.c:190 TRX CLK Indication 25757
<0011> trx.c:512 TRX Data 25808:0:0:82c074272b9d407e30b44143d79a20
<0011> trx.c:512 TRX Data 25809:0:0:618bfbb007ffc0f38b52440fad7c70
<0011> trx.c:512 TRX Data 25810:0:0:278f25f0c41b906604be6288b10310
<0011> trx.c:512 TRX Data 25811:0:0:a51bec5f9010e6fe6a32f311c21810
<0011> trx.c:190 TRX CLK Indication 25808
<0011> trx.c:512 TRX Data 25859:0:0:a847551a314dc060907c410b055130
<0011> trx.c:512 TRX Data 25860:0:0:22974400ea1647e9ab7e0003df5460
<0011> trx.c:512 TRX Data 25861:0:0:042f958b02511c670ff15001178680
<0011> trx.c:512 TRX Data 25862:0:0:9581ac70181285f07a0b57d681fe70
```

Further hacks on the Calypso platform or How to turn a phone into a BTS, Sylvain Munaut, 29C3, 29. december 2012, <<http://events.ccc.de/congress/2012/Fahrplan/events/5226.en.html>>.

...or we can build our own (2)



Source and copyright: prof. dr. ing. Andreas Steil,
<<http://www.fh-kl.de/~andreas.steil/Projekte/OpenBTS/>>

and

BackTrack R2 USRP Test Shot,
<<http://www.serverfault.sk/2011/03/backtrack-r2-usrp-test-shot-rfx900/>>.

```
Asterisk Console on 'bf (pid 25821) - Shell - Start Asterisk (verbose and console CLI)
Session Edit View Bookmarks Settings Help
-- SIP/IMS1231082462443021-0000001e is ringing
-- SIP/IMS1231082462443021-0000001e is ringing
-- SIP/IMS1231082462443021-0000001e is ringing
-- SIP/IMS1231082462443021-0000001e is ringing
-- SIP/IMS1231082462443021-0000001e is ringing
-- SIP/IMS1231082462443021-0000001e is ringing
-- SIP/IMS1231082462443021-0000001e is ringing
-- Using SIP RTP CoS mark 5
-- Executing [d44@sip-external:1] Macro(*SIP/IMS1231082462443020-0000001f*, *dialGM,IMS123
1082462443021*) in new stack
-- Executing [s@macro-dialGM:1] Dial(*SIP/IMS1231082462443020-0000001f*, *SIP/IMS123108246
2443021*) in new stack
-- Using SIP RTP CoS mark 5
-- Called IMS1231082462443021
-- SIP/IMS1231082462443021-00000020 is ringing
-- SIP/IMS1231082462443021-00000020 is ringing
-- SIP/IMS1231082462443021-00000020 answered SIP/IMS1231082462443020-0000001f
-- Locally bridging SIP/IMS1231082462443020-0000001f and SIP/IMS1231082462443021-00000020

System
-- OS: BackTrack 4 R2 'USRP' (i4f) 686
-- Kernel: linux2.6.35.8
-- Hostname: bf
-- Uptime: 2h 5m 24s
-- Processor:
-- CPU Freq: 2000 Mhz
-- CPU Temp: 0 C
-- CPU Usage: 69%

Memory
-- RAM: 2.96GiB
-- SWAP usage: 33% / 421.86MB
-- SWAP: 996.18MB
-- HDD to read/write: 0B / 0B
-- HDD temp: 39C

Processes: 423
-- top processes: PID CPU% MEM%
-- transceiver: 26087 53.77 0.14
-- OpenBTS: 26086 8.67 0.15
-- Xorg: 7554 4.49 2.65

Shell - Start OpenBTS
Session Edit View Bookmarks Settings Help
Active (5 sec)
2 transactions in table
OpenBTS> calls
1804289428 Ti=(1,0) IMSI=231082462443020 MTC from=444 Q,931State=MTC confirmed SI
PState=Proceeding (37 sec)
1804289433 Ti=(0,0) IMSI=231082462443020 MOC to=444 Q,931State=call received SIPS
tate=Ringng (6 sec)
1804289435 Ti=(1,0) IMSI=231082462443021 MTC from=333 Q,931State=call received SI
PState=Proceeding (6 sec)
3 transactions in table
OpenBTS> tmsis
TMSI IMSI app used
0x4d7554ce 231082462443021 ? 43m 41s
0x4d7556ae 231082462443020 ? 15m 16s
2 TMSIs in table
OpenBTS>
USRP - Test shot
```

...or we can build our own (3)



Doug DePerry, Tom Ritter in Andrew Rahimi, Traffic Interception & Remote Mobile Phone Cloning with a Compromised CDMA Femtocell, BlackHat 2013, <<https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-21/dc-21-presentations/DePerry-Ritter/DEFCON-21-DePerry-Ritter-Femtocell-Updated.pdf>>.

IMSI catcher detection

(Catcher Catcher)

```
matej@cryptopia: ~/catchercatcher/osmocom-bb/src/host/layer23/src/mobile
matej@cryptopia: ~/osmocom/osmoco... x matej@cryptopia: ~/catchercatcher/os
IMEI req: 0
SilentSMS: 0

status flag: GREEN

OsmocomBB# show catcher
Catcher status for MS '1'
link establishment
rach sent: 2
paging: 0
imm_ass: 1
assign: 0
handover: 0
release: 1
tune: 1
failure: 0
current: 0
high pwr: 0.00
cipher mode
request: 1
response: 1
no cipher: 0
no IMEISV: 0
first alg: A5/1
last alg: A5/1
cell monitoring
camped: 0
MCC: 293 (293, 0)
MNC: 40 (40, 0)
LAC:
CID:
data exchange
IMSI req: 0
IMEI req: 0
SilentSMS: 0

status flag: GREEN
```

```
Catcher status for MS '1'
link establishment
rach sent: 78
paging: 1
imm_ass: 0
assign: 0
handover: 0
release: 0
tune: 0
failure: 0
current: 1
high pwr: -
cipher mode
request: 0
response: 0
no cipher: 0
no IMEISV: 0
first alg: A5/0
last alg: A5/0
cell monitoring
camped: 0
MCC: 293 (293, 0)
MNC: 41 (41, 0)
LAC: 11 (11, 0)
CID: 10454 (103, 1)
data exchange
IMSI req: 0
IMEI req: 0
SilentSMS: 0

status flag: RED
```

...is available only for Osmocom platform

(FemtoCatcher is available only for Verizon network).

IMSI catcher detection (AIMSICD)



AIMSICD

Device Information

Phone Type: GSM
IMEI: [REDACTED]
RIL Version: 01

SIM Information

Country: si
Operator ID: 29340
Operator Name: N/A
IMSI: 29340 [REDACTED]
Serial: [REDACTED]

Network Information

Provider Name: Si.mobil
Provider Code: 29340
Type: UMTS
LAC: [REDACTED]
CID: [REDACTED]
PSC: [REDACTED]
Roaming: false
Data Activity: None
Data Status: Disconnected

AIMSICD

TRACKING

- Stop Monitoring Cell Details
- Stop Tracking Cell Details

MAIN

- Device Details
- Cell Information 862
- AT Command Processor
- Database Viewer
- Map Viewer

SETTINGS

- Preferences
- Backup Database

Map Viewer

CellID - [REDACTED]

Cell ID: [REDACTED]
Lat: [REDACTED]
Lng: [REDACTED]
MCC: 293
MNC: 40
Samples: [REDACTED]

OK

Map Viewer



BUSTED!

Smartphones security



Main approaches to smartphone security

- “Security enhanced” OS (usually some fork of Android, for instance Replicant, PrivatOS (Blackphone), Guardian ROM, CyanogenMod, etc.).
- Antivirus/malware detection.
- User/process separation.
- Screen lock with password (with brute force protection).
- Internal memory encryption.
- Encryption of digital communications (ZRTP VoIP calls, VPN,...).
- Anonimisation/hiding of traffic data.



Encrypted SMS messages: TextSecure



Encrypted phone calls: RedPhone



Encrypted phone calls: RedPhone



Unencrypted phone call (IP telefonija)

The screenshot displays the Wireshark interface for a capture file named 'sip.pcap'. The main window shows a list of captured packets, with a filter set to 'sip'. The packet list pane shows several SIP and SIP/SDP packets. A red box highlights the 'INVITE' packet (No. 82) with the following details:

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Info
82	23.453253	153.5	212.1	SIP/SDP	Request: INVITE sip:015805373@212.1, with

The packet details pane shows the structure of the INVITE message, including the 'Request-URI' field, which is highlighted with a red box:

```
Request-URI: sip:015805373@212.1
```

The packet bytes pane shows the raw data of the packet, including the SIP message body.

A 'VoIP Calls' window is open, showing a table of detected calls:

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Length	Protocol	Info
1	20:10:32.318					VoIP Calls
2	20:10:32.318					
3	20:10:32.667					
4	20:10:32.669					
5	20:10:33.454					
6	20:10:33.454					
7	20:10:39.671					
8	20:10:40.173					
9	20:10:41.175					
10	20:10:42.669					
11	20:10:42.671					
12	20:10:43.179					
13	20:10:47.665					
14	20:10:47.667					
15	20:10:50.715					
16	20:10:50.777					
17	20:10:52.669					
18	20:10:52.670					


The 'VoIP Calls' window also shows a table of detected calls:

Start Time	Stop Time	Initial Speaker	From	To	Protoco	Packets	State	Comments
21,162982	88,346119		<sip:031		SIP	7	COMPLETE	
102,384695	160,364970	172.16.0.116	"Matej Kovacic" <sip:031		SIP	14	COMPLETE	

The 'VoIP - RTP Player' window is open, showing a waveform of the selected RTP stream. The waveform shows a duration of 64.04 seconds with a drop by jitter buffer of 0(0,0%) and out of sequence of 0(0,0%).

[Demo]

Encrypted phone call





[Demo]

Traffic data of RedPhone calls

Analiza prometnih podatkov

datum in čas	Količina	Zarač. kol.	Destinacija	Storitev
1.6.2013 1:12	0 kB	0 kB	INTERNET	GPRS/UMTS prenos
1.6.2013 1:12	586 kB	590 kB	INTERNET	GPRS/UMTS prenos
1.6.2013 3:12	0 kB	0 kB	INTERNET	GPRS/UMTS prenos
1.6.2013 3:12	629 kB	630 kB	INTERNET	GPRS/UMTS prenos
1.6.2013 5:12	0 kB	0 kB	INTERNET	GPRS/UMTS prenos
1.6.2013 5:12	622 kB	630 kB	INTERNET	GPRS/UMTS prenos
1.6.2013 7:12	0 kB	0 kB	INTERNET	GPRS/UMTS prenos
1.6.2013 7:13	492 kB	500 kB	INTERNET	GPRS/UMTS prenos
1.6.2013 9:13	0 kB	0 kB	INTERNET	GPRS/UMTS prenos
1.6.2013 9:13	736 kB	740 kB	INTERNET	GPRS/UMTS prenos
1.6.2013 11:13	0 kB	0 kB	INTERNET	GPRS/UMTS prenos
1.6.2013 11:13	16.276 kB	16.280 kB	INTERNET	GPRS/UMTS prenos
1.6.2013 13:13	0 kB	0 kB	INTERNET	GPRS/UMTS prenos
1.6.2013 13:13	814 kB	820 kB	INTERNET	GPRS/UMTS prenos
1.6.2013 15:13	0 kB	0 kB	INTERNET	GPRS/UMTS prenos
1.6.2013 15:14	845 kB	850 kB	INTERNET	GPRS/UMTS prenos
1.6.2013 17:14	0 kB	0 kB	INTERNET	GPRS/UMTS prenos
1.6.2013 17:14	355 kB	360 kB	INTERNET	GPRS/UMTS prenos
1.6.2013 18:24	11 kB	20 kB	INTERNET	GPRS/UMTS prenos
1.6.2013 18:27	15 kB	20 kB	INTERNET	GPRS/UMTS prenos
1.6.2013 23:21	835 kB	840 kB	INTERNET	GPRS/UMTS prenos
2.6.2013 1:21	0 kB	0 kB	INTERNET	GPRS/UMTS prenos
2.6.2013 1:22	786 kB	790 kB	INTERNET	GPRS/UMTS prenos
2.6.2013 3:22	0 kB	0 kB	INTERNET	GPRS/UMTS prenos
2.6.2013 3:22	764 kB	770 kB	INTERNET	GPRS/UMTS prenos
2.6.2013 5:22	0 kB	0 kB	INTERNET	GPRS/UMTS prenos
2.6.2013 5:23	834 kB	840 kB	INTERNET	GPRS/UMTS prenos
2.6.2013 7:23	0 kB	0 kB	INTERNET	GPRS/UMTS prenos
2.6.2013 7:23	843 kB	850 kB	INTERNET	GPRS/UMTS prenos
2.6.2013 9:23	0 kB	0 kB	INTERNET	GPRS/UMTS prenos
2.6.2013 9:23	674 kB	680 kB	INTERNET	GPRS/UMTS prenos
2.6.2013 11:23	8 kB	10 kB	INTERNET	GPRS/UMTS prenos
2.6.2013 11:59	1 sms	1 sms	Slovenija4	SMS oddaja
2.6.2013 11:59	1 sms	1 sms	Slovenija4	SMS oddaja
2.6.2013 12:56	1 sms	1 sms	Slovenija5	SMS oddaja






tip klica	klicana oseba	datum in čas	trajanje
RP klic	Nemčija	Jun 1, 2013 12:52:36 PM	37
RP klic	Nemčija	Jun 1, 2013 12:53:28 PM	23
RP klic	Nemčija	Jun 1, 2013 12:54:40 PM	22
RP klic	Nemčija	Jun 1, 2013 12:59:26 PM	17

tip klica	klicana oseba	datum in čas	trajanje
RP klic	Nemčija	Jun 1, 2013 5:59:51 PM	10
RP klic	Nemčija	Jun 1, 2013 6:21:14 PM	70




tip klica	klicana oseba	datum in čas	trajanje
RP klic	Slovenija3	Jun 2, 2013 10:47:14 AM	11
RP klic	Slovenija3	Jun 2, 2013 10:47:52 AM	64
RP klic	Slovenija3	Jun 2, 2013 10:49:03 AM	102
RP klic	Slovenija3	Jun 2, 2013 10:50:52 AM	70
RP klic	Slovenija4	Jun 2, 2013 11:59:36 AM	2
RP SMS	Slovenija4	Jun 2, 2013 12:38:11 PM	2
RP SMS	Slovenija5	Jun 2, 2013 12:56:06 PM	1

Encrypted calls: CsipSimple and OSTN




Traffic data?

Encrypted instant messages: ChatSecure



Anonymisation...


How Tor Works: 3



Alice



Step 3: If at a later time, the user visits another site, Alice's tor client selects a second random path. Again, **green links** are encrypted, **red links** are in the clear.




Jane





Bob




Dave


































...of voice communication on a mobile phone



Voice communication on a mobile phone through Tor network



	Encrypted in transit?	Encrypted so the provider can't read it?	Can you verify contacts' identities?	Are past comms secure if your keys are stolen?	Is the code open to independent review?	Is security design properly documented?	Has there been any recent code audit?
Secret							
Signal / RedPhone							
Silent Phone							
Silent Text							
Skype							

Location tracking


Location privacy

- *“Cell phones are 'Stalin's dream.'
Cell phones are tools of Big Brother. I'm not going to carry a tracking device that records where I go all the time, and I'm not going to carry a surveillance device that can be turned on to eavesdrop.”*

--Richard Stallman, March 2011

Silent SMS

- Silent SMS (Type-0 ping”) is a special SMS message, which is not shown on a mobile phone. However, read receipt is generated and traffic data are also recorded (it is different from Class-0 SMS, so called flash SMS).
- Silent SMS'es are usually used for locating users.
 - German police sent about half million of silent SMS'es in 2010.




Silent SMS Intercepted

Silent Sms Message has been intercepted!

Details are available through the DbViewer

Location privacy



Source and copyright: Washington Post, NSA tracking cellphone locations worldwide, Snowden documents show, 4. december 2013, <<http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/how-the-nsa-is-tracking-people-right-now/634/>>.

Location privacy

- It is known that location tracking is being used for target assassinations with drones.
- Spoofing/blocking of network or radio identifiers:
 - IMEI: mostly illegal, there is an application *IMEI modifier*, which is not easy to use;
 - Bluetooth: switch it off;
 - NFC: switch it off;
 - MAC address: MAC changer/spoofers are not working on all devices, device needs to be *rooted*;
 - IMSI: only with changing of a SIM card.

Location privacy


- The only solution is to completely log out from the network... but then we are not talking about **mobile** phone anymore.
- SIM card removal is not enough – in that case mobile phone searches for base stations and still broadcasts IMEI number.
- The problem of location tracking cannot really be solved.

BUSTED!

Attacks to internal memory

Attacks to internal memory

- Problematic especially because of:
 - access to data on a mobile phone,
 - injecting malware.
- Solution: internal memory encryption!
However...




Tradeoff between security and usability

- Typical problem of tradeoff between security and usability is implementation of encryption of internal memory in Android.
- Currently, there is only one password for both the encryption and the screen lock. This password could be maximum 16 characters long. This is adequate protection for screen unlocking, but not for offline attacks.
- Using the same password:
 - (+) decreased probability that user would forget the password;
 - (-) it is not likely that user would use long password at frequent use (screen unlocking is frequent use!);
 - (-) short password (up to 16 characters) does not offer enough protection against *offline* attacks.

Cold Boot attack on mobile phones

- Cold Boot attack could be used to gain encryption keys from the encrypted mobile phone.
- Proof of concept: Tilo Müller, Michael Spreitzenbarth and Felix Freiling have developed tool called FROST (*Forensic Recovery Of Scrambled Telephones*).



Cold Boot attack on mobile phones

- On a personal computers there is some kind of protection against Cold Boot attack:
 - TRESOR: encryption keys could be stored in CPU cache instead of RAM-u (on processor with AES-NI instruction set);
 - PrivateCore vCage: RAM encryption (with TPM module and Intel Trusted Execution Technology - vCage Host loads a secure hypervisor into CPU cache and is acting as a gateway to encrypt memory paging in and out between the CPU cache and RAM).
- Mobile phones **does not have** such a technology (yet?).

Evil Maid attack on mobile phones

- Evil Maid attack (against computers protected with TrueCrypt) was introduced in 2009 by Joanna Rutkowska.
- Physical access is needed.
- Similar attack against mobile phones was introduced in 2012 by Thomas Cannon from Viaforensics.
- He has shown how to inject malware on a mobile phone through malformed USB charger.
- Malware can intercept passwords or enable remote access to mobile phone.

Evil Maid attack on mobile phones



Thomas Cannon, Into The Droid - Gaining Access to Android User Data,
<<https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-20/dc-20-presentations/Cannon/DEFCON-20-Cannon-Into-The-Droid.pdf>>

Evil Maid attack on mobile phones

- Possible solution is *dm-verity* (since Android 4.4):
 - provides integrity checking of file system and is detecting rootkits with root privileges (checks if booting a device is in the same state as when it was last used);
 - however, it does not check if bootloader has been properly authenticated;
 - can not detect a trojan placed in the ARM Trustzone (the *Security Extensions of ARM processors*) or on a SIM card.

BUSTED!

Baseband attacks

How much processors does your mobile phone have?

- Application processor (Tegra, Exynos, Snapdragon,...).
- Processor on a SIM card.
- Radio processor (*baseband processor, modem, radio*):
 - running *real time OS*;
 - is primary processor;
 - usually has full control over all the other hardware (including camera, microphone, screen, etc.);
 - some smartphones even use a shared memory architecture to transfer data from the baseband processor and application processor.

Attacks over the radio processor

- There are known cases, where law enforcement agencies used a covert listening device (a so called “*roving bug*“) in their investigations. One of the first known cases is from 2006 - in that case FBI remotely activated the cell phone microphone and listened to conversations in the vicinity of the phone, during its criminal investigation.
- Moreover, as Ralf-Philipp Weinman from the University of Luxembourg has shown that radio processors contain several security vulnerabilities. It is even possible to access a mobile phone from the network (through radio processor).

Attacks over the radio processor

- The group of developers who are working on Replicant, recently found that Android running on a Samsung Galaxy mobile phones contains backdoor.
 - A specific software code allows direct communication with the radio processor in a way that radio processor has direct access to the Android file system (reading, writing and erasing files). That software is able to access the user data, even if they are encrypted.
- Karsten Nohl has shown in 2013 that SIM cards are also vulnerable.

BUSTED!

**What about using external
encryption device?**

Using external, separated encryption device

- To prevent bypassing encryption software running on a mobile phone with malware, it is possible to use **external encryption device** (for instance JackPair).
 - Device is connected between mobile phone and earphones.
 - However, activation of external microphone does not physically turn the built-in microphone off!
Attacker can turn the internal microphone on with malware and thus effectively bypasses the encryption.



BUSTED!

Conclusion

- Data on a SIM card?
- Spoofing the identity of SMS sender?
- Spoofing the identity of a caller?
- GSM traffic security?
- Mobile identity?
- Traffic data in data retention database?
- Mobile network security?
- Mobile network authentication?
- Smartphones security:
 - Location tracking?
 - Attacks to internal memory?
 - Baseband attacks?
 - Using external encryption device?

BUSTED!

Conclusion

- Mobile phone security is not easy!
- Just buying some security software or “installing an antivirus” is not the final solution.
- Anyway, the question is how deep we need to go, what is our threat model?
 - sometimes screen lock is enough...
 - ...sometimes using applications for encrypting communication is necessary..
 - ...sometimes we must consider using the trash. :-)



*But there's an old saying inside
the NSA: "Attacks always get
better; they never get worse."*

--Bruce Schneier

BUSTED!



Questions?

<http://pravokator.si>

